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Covid-19:	Should	EU	states	share	the	economic
burden?
The	Italian	economy	has	been	left	in	a	particularly	vulnerable	position	by	the	Covid-19	outbreak.	Jasper	Doomen
examines	how	the	EU	could	attempt	to	share	the	economic	burden	of	the	crisis.	He	argues	that	while	there	are
grounds	for	some	form	of	solidarity,	attempts	to	bring	the	member	states	together	could	equally	end	up	pushing
them	further	apart.
One	of	the	European	countries	that	has	been	hardest	hit	by	the	spread	of	Covid-19	is	Italy.	Alongside	the
healthcare	problems,	the	outbreak	has	had	a	dire	effect	on	the	country’s	economy,	as	a	result	of	which	it	has
appealed	to	other	EU	member	states,	stressing	the	need	for	solidarity	between	them.	How	should	the	European
Union	respond	to	such	an	appeal?
Solidarity	between	the	member	states	is	an	important	principle	in	EU	law	(Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the
European	Union	(TFEU),	art.	122,	par.	1).	It	is	easy	to	adhere	to	such	a	lofty	principle	in	times	when	those	united
under	a	single	banner	have	no	need	to	invoke	it.	The	value	of	that	banner	is	put	to	the	test	in	times	when	their
interests	do	not	harmonise.	In	certain	respects,	the	European	Union,	and	in	particular	the	Eurozone,	is	more	aptly
characterised	as	a	union	of	dissent	than	as	an	organisation	whose	members	agree	upon	compliance	with
commonly	agreed	upon	rules.	May	a	country	such	as	Italy	rightly	call	on	the	European	Union	as	a	whole	and	thus,
in	fact,	on	those	countries	that	have	followed	a	more	austere	budgetary	policy	than	it	has?
Italy	is	faced	with	an	immediate	crisis,	to	which	a	swift	response	is	fitting.	This	is	arguably	not	the	time	to	blame	Italy
for	fiscal	policy	and	political	choices	that	have	resulted	in	its	present	poor	economic	position,	if	such	a	time	should
even	exist.	On	the	other	hand,	simply	providing	aid	does	not	seem	appealing,	either,	since	such	a	policy	could	be
viewed	as	rewarding	member	states	for	their	poor	choices.
Short-term	assistance	may	be	realised	by	referring	to	TFEU,	art.	122,	par.	2,	which	appears	to	provide	a	sufficient
basis	to	aid	Italy,	since	it	indicates	that	financial	assistance	may	be	granted	to	a	member	state	that	is	“seriously
threatened	with	severe	difficulties	caused	by	natural	disasters	or	exceptional	occurrences	beyond	its	control”.
Importantly,	the	article	stipulates	that	the	aid	shall	be	granted	“under	certain	conditions.”	Similarly,	art.	12,	par.	1,	of
the	Treaty	establishing	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	stipulates:	“If	indispensable	to	safeguard	the	financial
stability	of	the	euro	area	as	a	whole	and	of	its	Member	States,	the	ESM	may	provide	stability	support	to	an	ESM
Member	subject	to	strict	conditionality,	appropriate	to	the	financial	assistance	instrument	chosen.	Such
conditionality	may	range	from	a	macro-economic	adjustment	programme	to	continuous	respect	of	pre-established
eligibility	conditions.”
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Charles	Michel,	European	Council	President,	speaking	at	the	Coronavirus	Global	Response	pledging	conference	on	4	May,	Credit:
European	Union
Greece	was	aided	when	it	was	confronted	with	the	government-debt	crisis	of	2009.	It	was	forced,	in	return,	to
privatise	government	assets	and	to	reform	its	economy.	The	first	demand	could	be	made	here,	too	(although,
admittedly,	this	does	run	the	risk	of	fostering	undesirable	external	–	such	as	Chinese	–	influence).	In	exchange,
Italy	could	receive	the	means	to	address	healthcare	issues.	If	this	seems	too	harsh,	one	may	consider	making
funds	available	unconditionally,	provided	they	are	indeed	allocated	to	combat	the	immediate	health	problems.	The
need	for	economic	reforms	is	a	separate	issue,	to	which	I	will	return	below.
One	may,	in	addition,	consider	aiding	Italy	in	the	long	term;	the	aid	would	then	not	have	an	incidental	but	a
structural	character,	being	intended	to	support	the	Italian	economy.	In	this	case,	it	would	be	wise	to	exercise
restraint.	The	principal	argument	is	based	on	the	given	that	the	member	states	that	have	adhered	to	the	demands
that	the	ratio	of	the	government	deficit	to	gross	domestic	product	not	exceed	3%	and	that	the	ratio	of	government
debt	to	gross	domestic	product	not	exceed	60%	(TFEU,	art.	126,	par.	2,	in	conjunction	with	art.	1	of	Protocol	no.	12)
have	reaped	the	benefits	of	their	budgetary	policy.
Member	states	such	as	Finland	and	the	Netherlands	have	almost	consistently	met	these	criteria.	Their	economies
are	thriving	and	they	are	able,	accordingly,	to	issue	bonds	intended	to	solve	their	problems	at	low	interest	rates.
Being	cautious	when	structural	aid	for	those	member	states	which	have	consistently	not	met	them	is	not	to	be
interpreted	as	a	means	to	berate	them,	or	as	a	sort	of	punishment.	Rather,	aiding	them	unreservedly	conflicts	with
the	basic	idea	that	member	states	are	individually	responsible	for	implementing	sound	economic	policy.
The	European	Central	Bank	has	established	a	temporary	pandemic	emergency	purchase	programme	to	the
amount	of	EUR	750	billion,	notwithstanding	the	previously	defined	limit	of	33%	under	the	public	sector	asset
purchase	programme.	It	does	not	thus	directly	support	member	states,	but	it	is,	on	this	basis,	able	to	do	so
indirectly,	by	purchasing	bonds,	thereby	ensuring	that	member	states	will	be	able	to	continue	to	attract	sufficient
financial	means	at	an	interest	rate	that	is	mitigated	as	a	result	of	this	measure.
Italy	will	thus	be	able	to	increase	its	already	substantial	debt	at	–	veritably	artificially	–	low	interest	rates,	reducing	or
even	–	in	a	pessimistic	scenario	–	removing	its	incentive	to	carry	through	economic	reforms,	especially	if	it	is	able	to
operate	on	the	assumption	that	other	member	states	or	the	European	Union	as	a	whole	will	come	to	its	aid	if	the
debt	becomes	too	great	to	bear.	National	political	considerations	may	be	an	important	factor	as	well.
One	may	think	that	the	problems	are	exaggerated;	as	long	as	Italy	simply	promises	to	realise	the	reforms	desired
by	the	European	Union	(and	certain	member	states	in	particular),	the	issue	will	resolve	itself,	albeit	in	the	long	term,
its	debt	gradually	decreasing	to	manageable	proportions.	Still,	even	irrespective	of	the	issue	just	addressed,
namely,	that	the	incentive	to	realise	those	reforms	is	diminished,	the	demand	to	keep	the	government	deficit	and
debt	in	check	exists	for	all	member	states;	reforming	one’s	economy	as	a	means	to	realise	those	goals	just	means
that	one	does	what	one	is	already	obligated	to	do,	which	should	not	merit	a	special	reward.
It	would	be	a	positive	step	if	the	European	Union	were	to	disburden	Italy	as	far	as	the	country’s	immediate	needs
are	concerned,	irrespective	of	whether	the	other	member	states	consent	to	the	measures	on	the	basis	of
humanitarian	considerations	or	self-interest.	In	the	latter	case,	a	very	difficult	calculation,	given	the	variables,	would
have	to	be	made	in	order	to	determine	whether	they	are	–	in	the	long	run	–	better	off	without	Italy’s	presence	in	the
single	currency.	Arguably,	Italy	may	also	be	better	off	if	it	were	able	to	adopt	a	new	currency	and	pursue	a
devaluation.
Italy	is	currently	unable	to	pursue	this	strategy	as	it	is	bound	by	rules	that	other	member	states	are	able	and	willing
to	uphold.	While	other	member	states	consider	these	rules	to	be	sensible	directives,	the	prevailing	view	in	Italy	at
present	seems	to	deem	them	a	straitjacket	from	which	it	must	free	itself.	Given	the	fact	that	isolated	devaluation	is
impossible,	the	harm	of	the	‘remedy’	of	monetary	financing	cannot	be	ignored,	with	increased	inflation	in	the
Eurozone	in	its	wake	being	a	serious	danger.
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I	readily	grant	that	it	is	easy	for	me,	exercising	armchair	jurisprudence	from	a	relatively	comfortable	position,	to
judge	these	matters.	In	any	event,	should	it,	for	whatever	reason,	be	decided	that	certain	measures	are	necessary
in	addition	to	those	focused	on	addressing	the	immediate	healthcare	problems,	a	piecemeal	approach	would	be
prudent.	Such	an	approach	was	not	taken	by	the	former	President	of	the	European	Central	Bank	in	his	policy	of
quantitative	easing;	Italy	was,	as	a	result,	able	to	muddle	through.
It	is	difficult	to	say	what	the	effects	of	rigorous	measures	to	provide	structural	support	will	be,	but	the	adverse	result
of	the	attempt	to	bring	the	member	states	together	may	be	that	they	end	up	further	apart	than	ever	before.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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